Ostrom Glossary

Key Terminologies used by Ostrom

Institutional Analysis, Development, and Design: The process of understanding, developing, and designing institutions to organize human interactions.
Epistemological and Ontological Foundations: The philosophical basis of knowledge and reality in the context of institutional analysis.
Governance: The systems and processes that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are made, and how citizens are involved.
Polycentricity: The organization of governance systems around multiple, autonomous decision-making centers.
Action Situation: The social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, and create institutions.
Nature of the Good: The characteristics of the goods or services being produced or exchanged in an action situation.
Rules-In-Use: The agreed-upon rules that govern behavior in an action situation.
Attributes of the Community: The characteristics of the community that influence the action situation, such as cultural norms, social capital, and the distribution of resources.
Outcomes: The results of interactions and exchanges in an action situation.
Evaluative Criteria: The standards used to assess the outcomes of an action situation.
Feedback and Learning: The process of using information from past outcomes to inform future decisions and actions.
Grammar of Institutions: The set of rules that structure interactions within institutions.
Property Rights: The legal and social constructs that define ownership and control over resources.
Local Public Economies: The economic systems that operate at the local level, often involving public goods and services.
Design Principles: The fundamental guidelines for creating effective and sustainable institutions.
Social-Ecological Systems: The interconnected systems of humans and nature, which are often the focus of institutional analysis.
Behavioral Rational Choice: The theory that individuals make decisions based on their rational self-interest, within the constraints of their knowledge and resources.
Political Theory: The study of political power, institutions, and decisions, often used to inform institutional analysis.
Institutions: The prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions.
Analysis: The decomposition of institutional contexts into their component parts.
Common-Pool Resources (CPRs): Resources that are available to all members of a society but are limited in quantity.
Excludability: The degree to which a good or service can be limited to paying customers or members of a group.
Subtractability: The characteristic of a good where one person's use subtracts from the availability to others.
Appropriators: Individuals who have the right to withdraw resource units from the resource system.
Providers: Individuals or entities that provide the resource system.
Production Systems: The systems that produce goods or services.
Consumption Systems: The systems that consume goods or services.
Public Goods: Goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning they are available to all members of a society and one person's use does not subtract from another's.
Private Goods: Goods that are both excludable and rivalrous, meaning they are limited to paying customers or members of a group and one person's use subtracts from another's.
Toll Goods: Goods that are excludable but non-rivalrous, meaning they are limited to paying customers or members of a group but one person's use does not subtract from another's.
Common Goods: Goods that are non-excludable but rivalrous, meaning they are available to all members of a society but one person's use subtracts from another's.
Operational Rules: Rules that directly affect day-to-day decisions made by the individuals who are making choices in any action situation.
Collective-Choice Rules: Rules that affect operational rules.
Constitutional Rules: Rules that affect collective-choice rules.
Monitoring: The process of observing and checking the progress or quality of something over a period of time.
Sanctions: Penalties or other means of enforcement used to provide incentives for obedience with the rules established by a society or community.
Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms: Methods used to solve conflicts among individuals or groups.
Autonomous Users: Users who can make their own decisions without external control.
Nested Enterprises: Smaller, individual enterprises that are part of a larger enterprise.
Graduated Sanctions: Penalties that increase in severity with the seriousness and frequency of the offenses.
Mutual Monitoring: The process where individuals monitor each other's behavior to ensure compliance with agreed-upon rules.
Reciprocity: The practice of exchanging things with others for mutual benefit.
Trust: Confidence in or reliance on some person or quality.
Reputation: The beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or something.
Social Norms: Unwritten rules about how to behave in a particular social group or culture.
Cultural Context: The set of social and cultural conditions in which something occurs or exists.
Incentives: Something that motivates or encourages one to do something.
Adaptability: The ability to change or be changed in order to fit or work better in some situation or for some purpose.
Resilience: The capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.
Sustainability: The ability to be maintained at a certain rate or level.
Equity: The quality of being fair and impartial.
Efficiency: The state or quality of being efficient, or able to accomplish something with the least waste of time and effort.
Accountability: The fact or condition of being accountable; responsibility.
Transparency: The condition of being transparent, or easy to perceive or detect.
Participation: The action of taking part in something.
Deliberation: Long and careful consideration or discussion.
Consensus: General agreement.
Cooperation: The process of working together to the same end.
Coordination: The organization of the different elements of a complex body or activity to enable them to work together effectively.
Decentralization: The process of redistributing or dispersing functions, powers, people or things away from a central location or authority.

Ostrom and Game Theory

Game Theory: A mathematical model of strategic interaction among rational decision-makers.
Strategic Interaction: An interaction where the outcome for each participant or "player" depends on the actions of all.
Nash Equilibrium: A concept in game theory where no player can benefit by changing their strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged.
Prisoner's Dilemma: A standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.
Cooperative Game: A game where groups of players ("coalitions") may enforce cooperative behavior.
Non-Cooperative Game: A game with competition between individual players.
Zero-Sum Game: A situation in which one person's gain is equivalent to another's loss, so the net change in benefit or wealth is zero.
Payoff Matrix: A table in which strategies of one player are listed in rows and those of the other player in columns, and the cells show payoffs to each player.
Dominant Strategy: A strategy that is the best one for a player to follow no matter what strategy other players choose.
Mixed Strategy: A strategy in which a player makes a random choice among two or more possible actions based on a set of chosen probabilities.
Pure Strategy: A strategy that involves a specific and consistent choice.
Repeated Games: Games that are played by the same players more than once.
Sequential Games: Games where players have some knowledge about earlier actions.
Simultaneous Games: Games where players choose their actions without knowledge of the actions chosen by other players.
Common Pool Resource Game: A game that models the use of resources that are rivalrous and non-excludable.
Public Goods Game: A game that models the provision of public goods.
Free Rider Problem: A situation where some individuals consume more than their fair share or pay less than their fair share of the cost of a shared resource.
Tragedy of the Commons: A situation in a shared-resource system where individual users, acting independently according to their own self-interest, behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting the resource.
Social Dilemma: A situation in which an individual profits from selfishness unless everyone chooses the selfish alternative, in which case the whole group loses.
Collective Action Problem: The difficulty in motivating group members to contribute towards achieving a common goal.

Ostrom and Law, Legislation and Constitution

Formal Rules: These are rules that are officially recognized and enforced by an authoritative entity. They are often written and codified in law or policy.
Constitutional Rules: These are the highest level of rules that define how all other rules are made, changed, and interpreted. They often form the basis of a constitution, which is a set of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or other organization is governed.
Operational Rules: These are rules that directly affect day-to-day decisions made by the individuals who are making choices in any action situation. They are the rules that individuals typically take into account when making decisions.
Collective-Choice Rules: These are rules that affect operational rules. They determine who is eligible to participate in decision-making, what actions they can take, and how outcomes will be determined.
Legal Rights: These are rights that are recognized and protected by the legal system. They can include property rights, civil rights, and human rights.
Property Rights: These are the legal rights to use, control, and transfer a resource. They are a key concept in Ostrom's work, particularly in relation to common-pool resources.
Sanctions: These are penalties or other means of enforcement used to provide incentives for obedience with the rules established by a society or community.
Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms: These are methods used to solve conflicts among individuals or groups. They can be formal, such as court proceedings, or informal, such as negotiation or mediation.
Enforcement: This refers to the process of ensuring compliance with laws, regulations, rules, standards, or social norms.
Legitimacy: This refers to the general perception or belief that a rule or institution is appropriate and should be obeyed.
Authority: This refers to the power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience.
Jurisdiction: This refers to the official power to make legal decisions and judgments, often within a defined area.
Sovereignty: This refers to the full right and power of a governing body to govern itself without any interference from outside sources or bodies.
Legal Pluralism: This refers to the existence of multiple legal systems within one geographic area.
Rule of Law: This refers to the principle that all people and institutions are subject to and accountable to law that is fairly applied and enforced.
Due Process: This refers to fair treatment through the normal judicial system, especially as a citizen's entitlement.
Constitutionalism: This refers to adherence to a system of constitutional government.
Legal Framework: This refers to the structure that law provides to define and control actions in society.
Legal System: This refers to the mechanism for creating, enforcing, and interpreting laws in a specific jurisdiction.
Legal Precedent: This refers to a legal case that establishes a principle or rule that a court or other judicial body utilizes when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts.

Scientists influencing Ostrom

Harold Demsetz: Demsetz is an economist known for his work on property rights, the theory of the firm, and transaction costs. Ostrom often refers to Demsetz in discussions about property rights and their role in managing common-pool resources. Demsetz's work helps to explain how property rights emerge in response to economic factors.
Mancur Olson: Olson was a political economist who wrote extensively on collective action. His book, "The Logic of Collective Action," is often cited by Ostrom in discussions about the challenges of organizing groups to manage common resources. Olson's work highlights the difficulties in preventing free-riding in groups.
Garrett Hardin: Hardin was a biologist and ecologist who wrote the influential essay "The Tragedy of the Commons." Ostrom refers to Hardin's work to explain the potential for overuse and degradation of common-pool resources when individuals act in their own self-interest. However, Ostrom also challenges Hardin's pessimistic view by showing how communities can successfully manage common resources.
James M. Buchanan: Buchanan was an economist known for his work on public choice theory, which applies economic analysis to political decision-making. Ostrom refers to Buchanan's work in discussions about the behavior of individuals within political systems and the design of institutions.
Ronald Coase: Coase was an economist known for his work on transaction costs and property rights, particularly the "Coase Theorem," which suggests that under certain conditions, private bargaining can lead to an optimal allocation of resources. Ostrom refers to Coase's work in discussions about the role of institutions in reducing transaction costs and facilitating cooperation.
Thomas Schelling: Schelling was an economist known for his work on game theory and complex systems, particularly his model of segregation. Ostrom refers to Schelling's work in discussions about strategic interactions and the emergence of patterns in complex systems.
Robert Axelrod: Axelrod is a political scientist known for his work on the evolution of cooperation, particularly his use of the prisoner's dilemma game to study strategies for cooperation. Ostrom refers to Axelrod's work in discussions about the conditions that can foster cooperation in the management of common resources.
Douglass North: North was an economist known for his work on institutional economics, particularly his analysis of how institutions evolve and how they shape economic performance. Ostrom refers to North's work in discussions about the role of institutions in shaping human behavior and economic outcomes.