Irrigation Monitoring -- Ostrom

Rules in Use and The Design Principle -- An Interpretive Summary
Ostrom Glossary

This is a summary, for learning purpose

In the context of irrigation systems, Elinor Ostrom discusses how monitoring can be a natural by-product of the rules and incentives in place. She gives an example of farmers waiting for their turn in an irrigation rotation system.

In an irrigation rotation system, farmers take turns using the water for irrigation. When a farmer nears the end of their rotation turn, they would naturally want to extend their time to obtain more water for their crops. On the other hand, the next farmer in the rotation system is waiting nearby and may even want to start their turn early.

This situation creates a form of monitoring without the need for additional resources or external enforcers. The presence of the first farmer deters the second farmer from starting early, and the presence of the second farmer deters the first farmer from extending their turn. Both farmers have strong motivations to use their water rotation turns to the fullest extent, which naturally leads to monitoring each other's behavior.

By having farmers directly involved in monitoring and enforcing the rules of the irrigation system, the costs of monitoring are kept low. This example illustrates how the design of the rules and incentives within a system can influence the efficiency of monitoring and enforcement without the need for external authorities.

Ostrom's research suggests that when farmers have a stake in the irrigation system and are directly affected by its performance, they are more likely to engage in monitoring and enforcement activities. This is because they have a vested interest in ensuring that the system is functioning properly and that water resources are being used sustainably.

Furthermore, Ostrom's work demonstrates that self-governance is possible in irrigation systems. Rational actors can monitor and sanction each other, under certain conditions, to ensure compliance with rules and regulations. This finding challenges the conventional belief that external authorities or top-down regulation are necessary for effective irrigation management.

Quotes:

"The monitoring of the actions of appropriators or users by other appropriators or users is a key feature of many long-enduring common-pool resource institutions. Monitoring is a form of graduated sanctions that can be used to detect and punish those who violate the rules" (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90).
"Monitoring is most effective when it is carried out by individuals who are part of the same community as the appropriators themselves" (Ostrom, 1990, p. 91).
"Monitoring is most effective when it is carried out by individuals who are part of the same community as the appropriators themselves" (Ostrom, 1990, p. 91).
"It has almost uniformly been assumed that because farmers' interests are so clearly affected by the construction of field canals and the maintenance of distribution works, they will simply organize themselves to take care of providing and maintaining these small-scale works once the large-scale public works have been provided by a national government." (p. 26)
"The first is that the simple presence of a collective benefit is sufficient to assure that individuals will organize to obtain it. The second is that farmers who are not assured a reliable supply of water will make significant investment in provision." (p. 26)
"Whenever the Old Field is to be cultivated it is essential for the whole village to adhere closely to a predetermined program of work, for when the tank sluices are open the whole field can take water and when the sluices are shut the whole field must run dry." (p. 11)
"There must, therefore, be agreement about the dates on which the sluice will be opened, the date at which sowing will be completed, the varieties of rice that will be sown, and the dates at which it is planned to have harvest ready and the field drained." (p. 11)
"Philip the Second responded with protection and limited aid. He gave license to the city of Alicante to build the dam and to borrow money for this purpose. Although he refused to provide capital because the work would in good part benefit existing landowners, he agreed, after obtaining approval from the church, to assign the proceeds of tithes and first fruits from the lands to be benefited (that is, 10 percent of their crops) to the city to amortize the costs of building the dam." (p. 21)
"Finally, he agreed that authority and responsibility for distributing water from the dam would remain with the city so that the farmers did not lose control over their destinies to any significant degree." (p. 21)

Sources: intros3michiganvolsowpapers19992000.pdf, Governingthecommons_4.pdf